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1. Introduction  
Following the great financial crisis in 2008, preventing future bail-outs for large, systemically 
important banks while minimizing the repercussions of bank insolvencies on the stability of the 
financial system and the economy at large has become a key policy objective for international 
standard-setters as well as national and supranational policy-makers and regulators. The focus has 
been not just on the prevention of systemic contagion and the protection of insured depositors and 
client assets and monies, but also, first and foremost, on minimizing the public and private costs of 
containing bank crises. Given the global nature of the financial crisis and the cross-border economic 
implications, it is hardly surprising that initiatives to accomplish these objectives have been global 
in scope, while their implementation has principally been guided by the legal frameworks in the 
respective jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, all have been focused on the specific challenges encountered 
in transnational bank crisis resolutions.  
The European Union (EU) and United States (US) frameworks establish a set of tools to ‘resolve’ a 
failing bank without recourse to formal insolvency proceedings, thereby creating a clear policy 
demarcation between resolution and insolvency. Within this framework, which draws from the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) approach, ‘resolution’ may be understood as functional alternative to 
court-sanctioned traditional insolvency procedures such as liquidation and administration, or as an 
essential prelude to applying for insolvency proceedings. 1 In the EU it has become the preferred 
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approach in bank resolution plans of national resolution authorities, partly reflecting the lack of 
credibility and feasibility of the national bank liquidation processes.2 
Resolution established a regime that should impose broadly similar economic consequences for 
bank owners, management, and major stakeholders while avoiding potential detrimental knock-on 
effects that could result from the application of the traditional procedures under insolvency law. In 
this context, the principle that losses in bank debt should be borne primarily by bank owners and 
investors became paramount, while the ranking of claims in this context broadly, although not fully, 
follows the principles of general insolvency law, and creditors should receive no less because of 
‘resolution’ than they would have received in a traditional insolvency liquidation of the relevant 
institution.3  
The introduction of resolution tools tailored to the needs of insolvencies of large, complex, 
internationally active banks and banking groups has not removed the existing approaches and 
procedures for dealing with institutions of ‘no public interest’. Indeed, within Europe the BRRD 
expressly provides that where a failing bank’s outright liquidation under general insolvency laws 
would not give rise to concerns regarding public policy interests (the ‘public interest’ test), 
‘resolution’ under the BRRD should not be allowed and the relevant bank should be liquidated in 
ordinary insolvency (bankruptcy) proceedings instead.4 Against this backdrop, Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
                                                          
2 See Section 2.3 of the Introduction to Resolution Planning: ‘The first step is to determine whether winding 
up under normal insolvency proceedings would be credible and feasible, because this is the normal option for 
a failing bank. Only if this is not credible or feasible, the factors determining the preferred resolution strategy 
and its implementation are described.’ See  
https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/intro_resplanning.pdf.pdf.  
3  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance (BRRD) Art. 34(1)(g) and SRMR Art. 15(1); 
see G Marc, Valuation of Difference in Treatment Ex Post Resolution – No Creditor Worse off than under 
Liquidation (NCWOL), 139–42 in World Bank, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A 
Guidebook to the BRRD, (2017). See also the communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 
August 2013, of state aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis 
(Banking Communication) 2013/C 216/01 referred to in Kotnik and others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:570. 
4  BRRD Preamble, recital 45 and Art. 32(5). Recital 45 BRRD:A failing institution should in principle be 
liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings. However, liquidation under normal insolvency proceedings 
might jeopardise financial stability, interrupt the provision of critical functions, and affect the protection of 
depositors. In such a case it is highly likely that there would be a public interest in placing the institution under 
resolution and applying resolution tools rather than resorting to normal insolvency proceedings. And see, for 
further analysis, J-H Binder, ‘Proportionality at the Resolution Stage: Calibration of Resolution Procedures and 
the Public Interest Test’ Working Paper 3 July 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990379. 
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(2018) and Nieto (2016) defend the need to harmonize and ultimately unify bank insolvency law in 
the banking union.5 
This paper analyses the EU and US approaches to bank insolvency and reflects on the effectiveness 
of insolvency procedures for banks (and their holding companies in the United States), as well as on 
the advantages and disadvantages of a dual system that includes an administrative authority and 
court-based procedures. The paper also analyses the need for coordination through harmonization 
in the EU, and especially in the euro area, and the need for enhanced substantive coordination with 
a view to development of the European Deposit Insurance System (EDIS). 
After this introduction, this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 presents the current state 
of debate of the EU versus US approaches to bank insolvency. Section 3 analyses the effectiveness 
of ‘dual’ administrative and court-based bank liquidation procedures for the purpose of both 
coordination within the EU and cross-border coordination. Conclusions and policy implications are 
presented in Section 4. 
2. EU versus US approaches to bank insolvency: Current state of debate  
In the EU the Commission's communication of October 2010 set out a general programme for a 
comprehensive EU framework to manage distressed and failing banks.6 The Commission envisaged 
proceeding gradually towards such a regime in three steps. As a first step, a directive establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms was 
adopted in June 2014. 7  Its substantive content envisages an administrative procedure for the 
recovery and orderly resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in EU primary 
legislation.8 It subsequently served as the blueprint for the corresponding arrangements within the 
European Banking Union for the euro-area countries aimed at internalizing potential negative 
spillovers of bank resolution, whereby resolution strategy is developed by the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB) and executed by national resolution authorities in the Single Resolution Mechanism.9 
                                                          
5 Bénassy-Quéré, Brunnermeier, Enderlain, Farhi, Fratscher, Fuest, Gourinchas, Martin, Pisani-Ferry, Schnabel, 
Veron, Weder Di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (2018) ‘Reconciling Risk Sharing with Market Discipline: A 
Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform’ Center for European Policy Research Policy Insight No 91, January. 
MJ Nieto, Bank Resolution and Mutualization in the Euro Area (2016), European Economy Banks, Regulation, 
and the Real Sector, 2016.2, pp131-154 
6 DG Internal Market and Services Working Document ‘Technical Details of a Possible EU Framework for Bank 
Recovery and Resolution’ October 2010. 
7 Council Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 on establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution 
of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EC, and Directives 
2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU, and 2013/36/EU, 
and Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 173, 12 June 2014. 
8 BRRD Recital 15, Art. 3. 
9 Regulation 806/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules 
and uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework 
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In the euro area, in the case of financial institutions subject to the SRB’s jurisdiction, the BRRD 
measures override any national parallel regime. Thus irrespective of whether or not the national 
regime was invoked prior to the SRB initiation of its plan, the SRB’s plan takes precedence. For this 
purpose, resolution authorities will only have recourse to the BRRD transposition laws, which apply 
to the entire EU. The initiation of insolvency procedures for banks inside the scope of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is reserved to the European Central Bank (ECB), which makes the 
assessment of ‘failing or likely to fail’ after consulting the SRB.10 After this assessment the ECB 
informs the SRB, which then assesses whether the conditions for a resolution action in relation to 
the bank are met. If the bank is considered of no ‘public interest’, the bank will be wound up under 
the national insolvency procedures. For the purposes of the public interest test, the ‘systemic 
importance’ and ‘substitutability’ of a bank’s functions and core business lines need to be taken into 
consideration to determine their critical importance. This is assessed by considering the bank’s 
function in terms of size of market share, domestic and/or cross-border exposures, level of 
interconnectedness, complexity of the function, and the degree to which the function is less likely 
to be substitutable in view of the number of competitors in the market. Given these criteria, the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) noted that some national authorities simply assume all banks 
taking deposits are considered to provide critical functions, but this is arguably not the case once 
more granular criteria are applied.11 The SRB monitors the insolvency procedure of the bank and 
the deposit insurance scheme efforts to collect on the deposit claims to which it subrogated.12 
The ‘public interest’ test opens the door for degrees of discretion and inconsistency of approach in 
regard to the application of national bankruptcy proceedings for banks which would not qualify for 
resolution. It is worth noting that, in the absence of any EU-wide harmonization of relevant laws, 
this discretion extends beyond technicalities (the choice of legal instruments and the allocation of 
resolution powers to courts or administrative bodies) and includes the definition of underlying 
policy objectives regarding the ranking of claims, creditors’ procedural rights, and, most 
fundamentally, the role of the state in the funding of liquidation and/or restructuring. Also, set-off 
and collateral arrangements are minimally harmonized by the Financial Collateral Directive.13 The 
                                                          
of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (L225 
20.7.2014). 
10 Article 18(1) subparagraph 2 of Regulation (EU) 806/2014. The circumstances for the assessment of ‘failing 
or likely to fail’ are established in Article 18(4) of Regulation (EU) 806/2014. 
11  BRRD Recital 9; EBA Report, Recovery Planning: Comparative Report on the Approach to Determining 
Critical Functions and Core Business Lines in Recovery Plans, 6 March 2015; for discussion see D Singh, 
Recovery and Resolution Planning: Reconfiguring Financial Regulation and Supervision in J-H Binder and D 
Singh, Bank Resolution: The European Regime (OUP, 2016) at paras 1.30–1.32. 
12  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 
806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. COM (2015)686 final. 2015/0270 (COD). 
Strasbourg 24.11.2015 (Article 41q). 
13 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral 
arrangements (OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, 43); amended by Directive 2009/44/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 6 May 2009 L 146 37 10.6.2009; and Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 May 2014 L 173 190 
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resulting ‘landscape’ of bank insolvency laws across Europe is highly diverse, as national approaches 
have varied considerably not just on the extent to which courts are involved in case management 
but also in terms of the applicable substantive laws.14 
For banks that fail to satisfy the ‘public interest’ test as a precondition for application of the 
resolution tools contained in the BRRD,15 European legislation has no provisions that can be applied. 
Other than the Reorganization and Winding-up Directive of 2001, which provides for conflict-of-
laws provisions applicable to banks, there is no substantive harmonization of national insolvency 
procedures.16 The Winding-up Directive contains principles of universality (all the bankrupt bank’s 
assets and the claims against these assets are treated equally regardless of their location; Articles 
3(1) and 9(1)) and unity (single set of proceedings covering both the insolvent bank’s head office 
and its foreign branches in the EU; Article 7). These were introduced by ascribing exclusive 
jurisdiction to home-country resolution authorities and courts. 17 This reflects a lack of political 
consensus on procedures and institutional arrangements for the management of bank insolvencies 
among member states. To date no attempt has been made to provide for respective substantive 
harmonization.18 Figure 1 shows the different approaches to resolution and liquidation in the US 
and the EU. 
The Commission’s plan to examine the need for further harmonization of bank insolvency regimes 
was not followed through. Although corporate insolvency was revisited in the context of the 
European Council initiative to launch a Capital Market Union complementary to bank financing in 
June 2015, the assessment relating to bank insolvency law is limited. 19  The EU Regulation on 
insolvency shifts focus away from liquidation and towards helping businesses overcome financial 
                                                          
14 For example, in Slovenia, Banka Slovenije is the competent authority for the implementation of compulsory 
liquidation proceedings for banks and has the competence to initiate bankruptcy proceedings in relation to a 
bank with the relevant court. The aim of compulsory liquidation proceedings initiated by Banka Slovenije is to 
conclude the bank’s operations and repay the bank’s obligations vis-à-vis depositors. 
15 Pursuant to Article 32(1)(c) BRRD (Article 18(1)(c) SRM Reg), resolution actions are permissible only where 
they can be established to be in the public interest, which, pursuant to Article 32(5) BRRD (Article 18(5) SRM 
Reg) is the case ‘if it is necessary for the achievement of and is proportionate to one or more of the resolution 
objectives referred to in Article 31 and winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings 
would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent’ (emphasis added). 
16 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation 
and winding up of credit institutions. 
17 Such principles were enshrined in Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (OJ L 125, 5.5.2001). Note that financial 
institutions were excluded from the regulation harmonizing collective insolvency proceedings which entail the 
partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator. Council Regulation (EC) No 
1346/2000 of 29 May, 2000 (OJ L 160, 30.6.2000). 
18 GG Garcia, RM Lastra, and MJ Nieto, Bankruptcy and Reorganization Procedures for Cross-border Banks in 
the EU: Towards an Integrated Approach to the Reform of the EU Safety Net, J Fin Reg and Compliance 17(3), 
2009, 240–276. 
19 Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on a CMU, ECOFIN 473, Brussels 16 June 2015; D 
Valiante, Study: Harmonising Insolvency Laws in the Euro Area: Rationale, Stock-taking and Challenges. What 
Role for the Eurogroup? ECON PE 574.428. 
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difficulties, and all the while protecting creditors’ right to get their money back.20  Speed, cost 
effectiveness, and predictability are of the essence for efficient national corporate insolvency 
regimes, along with clear rules on cross-border insolvency. The regulation has within its scope small 
and medium-sized companies with simple creditor structures. It provides for less court involvement 
and significantly restricts creditor rights. In sum, the Commission’s plans focus on corporate 
insolvency frameworks, which may facilitate the reduction of the volume of a bank’s non-
performing loans and eventually the need to liquidate the bank. However, the harmonization of the 
bank liquidation regime is left intentionally out of scope.  
The recent EU Directive that harmonizes the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in the bank 
insolvency hierarchy is an important step not only to facilitate the application of bail-in.21 This 
development should be contextualized in the concurrent development of the principle of ‘no 
creditor worse off than in insolvency’, which means that no creditor should be left worse off in the 
resolution than in a hypothetical insolvency scenario. It requires that the basic rights of creditors 
are observed by ensuring the continuation of some types of contract (secured liabilities) and 
constrains the impact of a potential bail-in from disproportionally affecting certain creditors (non-
insured depositors). Most importantly for the purposes of our analysis, such harmonization 
contributes to the alignment of creditors’ hierarchy in both resolution and liquidation. This reduces 
inconsistent practices across member states in likely demands for liquidity and loss coverage on 
national deposit guarantee schemes Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) and aligns incentives for 
future mutualization of national DGSs in the EDIS.22  
 
  
                                                          
20 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (L 141/19, 5.6.2015) (Recast), Recital 10. As a next step, the EU is leading an insolvency initiative 
that would allow viable businesses in distress to be rescued and honest but bankrupt individuals to be given 
a second chance: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive 
restructuring frameworks, second chances, and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, 
insolvency, and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU. COM (2016) 723Final. 2016/0359 
(COD) Strasbourg 22.11.2016. With the aim of reducing the level of banks’ non-performing loans (NPLs), in 
March 2018 the European Commission presented a package of measures to address the risks related to high 
levels of NPLs in Europe. The package includes a proposal for a directive on credit servicers, credit purchasers, 
and the recovery of collateral, a proposal for a regulation amending the capital requirements regulation, and 
a blueprint for the set-up of national asset management companies (see 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/180314-proposal-non-performing-loans_en). 
21 Directive (EU) 2017/2399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 amending 
Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy 
(L347/96, 27.12.2017).  
22 MJ Nieto (2016), Bank Resolution and Mutualization in the Euro Area, European Economy Banks, Regulation, 
and the Real Sector, 2016.2, pp131-154. 
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Figure 1: Bank insolvency management 
Panel I: EU 
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In the US, the legislative responses to the financial crisis did not significantly affect the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) long-standing authority to resolve insured depository banks 
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), other than to eliminate any option of open bank 
assistance and to constrain the FDIC’s ability to guarantee debt offerings used in the Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program. Since 2007 the FDIC has dealt with 531 bank closures, which resulted 
in loss rates between 4.9 per cent (2007) and 21.7 per cent (2017) of banks’ total assets. The broad 
flexibility to design the ‘least costly’ resolution approach or to implement a ‘systemic risk’ resolution 
for an insured depository bank did not change. Figure 1 shows differences between bank resolution 
and liquidation management in the EU and the US.  
The adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 created an optional dual resolution framework for non-
bank financial companies (such as bank holding companies or broker dealers) that combined a 
strong preference for the judicial insolvency framework provided by the US Bankruptcy Code with 
the option to resolve financial companies that pose systemic risks under the separate administrative 
process provided by Title II (Orderly Liquidation Authority) of the Dodd-Frank Act. It can be argued 
that this new hybrid resolution framework remains controversial. The election of President Trump, 
along with control of both Houses of Congress by the Republican Party, led many to fear that the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) might be repealed. While there is always a risk given the sharp 
political divides now in the US, the threat of repeal has now receded.  
On 21 February 2018 the US Treasury Department released its long-awaited report on OLA. The 
report, ‘Orderly Liquidation Authority and Bankruptcy Reform’ (the Report), recommends retaining 
OLA and adopting a new Chapter 14 of the US Bankruptcy Code (the Code) to make resorting to OLA 
proceedings less likely. In the Report, Treasury ultimately proposed only modest changes to OLA 
designed to clarify treatment of creditors, tighten the terms for funding from the Orderly Liquidation 
Fund (OLF) line of credit from Treasury, and strengthen judicial review of the decision to initiate OLA. 
The new proposed Chapter 14, which has been developed over several years and has been the 
subject of several legislative proposals, would include many of OLA’s powers, such as a bridge 
company and temporary stays on termination of qualified financial contracts (QFCs). A broad 
consensus within the US supports Chapter 14 as reasonable improvements in the capabilities of the 
Bankruptcy Code process for resolution of financial companies. The Report recommends that 
Chapter 14 only apply to financial company insolvencies that potentially could create some systemic 
risks. The goal of reducing the need to resort to OLA is clear. 
However, Treasury’s recommendations would leave OLA intact. The Report addressed specific 
criticisms of OLA but did not significantly alter the powers to resolve a systemically important 
financial institution. Treasury concluded that OLA was necessary as a backstop to bankruptcy in 
extraordinary cases where private financing is unavailable and to reduce the potential for foreign 
regulators to ring-fence the foreign operations of Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFIs). Treasury recognized the value of OLA both to serve as a back-up process and also to provide 
an improved environment for international engagement. After all, OLA embodies the main elements 
of the FSB’s ‘key attributes’. Of course, the ultimate fate of OLA will be determined through the 
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political process, but it is safe to say that the value it provides as an optional insolvency process is 
more broadly recognized than in the past. 
It is important to remember that there have been no proposals to repeal the pre-Dodd-Frank Act 
authority for the FDIC to act as receiver for failed insured banks. There have been occasional 
proposals to restrict the FDIC’s authority to apply its ‘systemic risk’ exception, but material changes 
in this authority also appear unlikely.23  
Annex I presents detailed information of the basic characteristics of bank liquidation procedures in 
the US, Germany, the UK, and Spain. Differences exist in the management of the liquidation process 
between the US and the EU countries (Germany, the UK, and Spain), and even among these three 
EU countries differences exist on who decides to initiate bank liquidation, who manages the 
moratorium, and, at the time of writing, who prioritizes claims. Such differences seem to explain, at 
least partly, the differences in loss rates of bank liquidation, which are generally smaller in the US 
(maximum of 21.7 per cent of total assets). Anecdotal evidence from Germany shows that the 
different DGS, as creditors in the insolvency procedure, experienced loss rates of approximately 32.5 
per cent during the period 1995 to 2008; similar evidence from the UK shows that its DGS 
experienced loss rates of approximately 36.6 per cent in a very recent bank liquidation. 
    
Table 2 summarizes the most relevant characteristics of the institutional frameworks for bank 
resolution and bank liquidation in selected countries, including the US. Table 3 presents a summary 
of those characteristics for Germany, the UK, and Spain. 
 
3. Lex generalis, lex specialis, and hybrid approaches to banks’ bankruptcy: Some reflections 
The fact that different jurisdictions have gone their respective idiosyncratic ways in the 
development of bank insolvency procedures for non-systemically important institutions clearly 
warrants some caution when approaching the question of ‘what works best’. This view is reinforced 
by a number of comparative studies of different bank insolvency regimes conducted at the 
beginning of the 2000s, partly in academic research24 and partly arising out of international financial 
                                                          
23 The Systemic risk exception applies when the FDIC wants to resolve a bank in a way that protects otherwise 
uninsured creditors of the bank at the expense of the insurance fund. This requires political approval. The 
FDIC is not required to obtain political approval for resolutions that are in accord with the least cost. See 
proposed changes in the Financial Choice Act, §242. More limited legislation was introduced into the Senate 
by the outgoing chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, Richard Shelby. It is unclear whether these issues 
will be a focus for new Senate Banking Committee Chairman Crapo or whether the new president will push 
for repeal of the OLA. 
24 See EHG Hüpkes, The Legal Aspect of Bank Insolvency (Kluwer 2000), 49–106; and see, for a functional 
comparison of the pre-crisis approaches in Germany and the UK, Binder, Bankeninsolvenzen im Spannungsfeld 
zwischen Bankaufsichts- und Insolvenzrecht (Duncker & Humblot 2005); RM Lastra and HN Schiffman, Bank 
Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition (Kluwer Law International 1999); A Campbell and 
P Cartwright, Banks in Crisis: The Legal Response (Ashgate 2002). 
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institutions and standard-setting bodies.25 Quite in line with the pre-crisis consensus (or, rather, lack 
of consensus),26 in a survey of national approaches across a wide range of jurisdictions published as 
part of their Global Bank Insolvency Initiative at the beginning of the 2000s, the IMF and the World 
Bank expressly recognized the conceptual validity of different institutional approaches, subject to 
certain functional conditions that may or may not be in place in a system.27 To complicate things 
even further, the above analysis of different jurisdictions (just as the pre-crisis comparative 
literature) also demonstrates that the policy choice is not confined to a rather simple lex specialis, 
lex generalis dichotomy. As evidenced in particular by the examples of Spain and Germany, the 
combination of administrative procedures and court-based case management provides legal 
certainty but does not always result in minimal total costs (see Annex 1). 
The financial crisis has highlighted the need to strengthen early intervention measures by 
supervisors, irrespective of whether the bank crisis is dealt with through administrative resolution 
procedures or court-based liquidation (or a combination of the two). Such early intervention 
measures may include requests to raise funds by bank shareholders and bank recovery plans which 
envisage liquidation of banks (or parts of banks) with no ‘public interest’. In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, we also observe the convergence of restructuring tools used in bank insolvency and 
bank resolution; for example, the same priority of claims when absorbing losses. 
In the EU the bank crisis management framework designed in 2010 aimed at ensuring that if the 
problems of an institution are irreversible and there is no private or supervisory solution, recovery 
and resolution of the ailing entity are not the only, or even the preferable, option for the authorities. 
Accordingly, the Commission’s view is that the general rule should be that failing credit institutions 
should be liquidated under ordinary insolvency proceedings.28 Only when this is not feasible will 
resolution using the alternative tools provided by the BRRD be necessary, for reasons of financial 
stability: to minimize contagion, ensure continuity of vital economic functions, maximize the value 
of remaining assets, and facilitate the return of the restructured bank to the private sector. In any 
form of liquidation, the insolvent bank essentially disappears in full or in part. In this context, 
‘significance’ of the relevant institution in terms of the scope of the SSM does not necessarily mean 
that the institution will be considered in need of resolution under the BRRD (see Table 3). For 
example, in June 2017 the SRB decided that Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA and Veneto Banca SpA, 
deemed significant banks (based on total assets between (€30–50 billion) by the ECB,29 had not met 
                                                          
25 See MC Asser, Legal Aspects of Regulatory Treatment of Banks in Distress (IMF 2001); M Giovanoli and G 
Heinrich (eds), International Bank Insolvencies: A Central Bank Perspective (Kluwer 1999). 
26 RM Lastra (ed), Cross-border Bank Insolvency (OUP 2011). 
27  IMF and World Bank, ‘An Overview of the Legal, Institutional, and Regulatory Framework for Bank 
Insolvency’ 17 April 2009, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/041709.pdf at paras 17–20. 
28 See also Article 32(5) BRRD, which explicitly implements this notion as part of the ‘public interest’ test (supra, 
text and n. [xxx]). And see, to the same effect, BRRD, preamble, indent 46, stating that ‘The winding up of a 
failing institution through normal insolvency proceedings should always be considered before resolution tools 
are applied.’ 
29 The Single Supervisory Mechanism definition of significant bank includes the three largest banks of the 
participating member states, which may or not be systemic.  
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the conditions for a resolution action, and as a consequence the winding up of these banks did take 
place under national proceedings launched by the Italian authorities.30 The two banks were not 
listed as Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SII’s) by the national designated authorities 
for the purposes of capital buffers in line with Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) (which are 
applied when the institutions are deemed to be providing critical functions in their respective 
markets and so in view of their importance are considered to be a potential risk to financial stability). 
Similarly, the most recent decision by the SRB regarding ABLV bank,31 a significant bank in Latvia 
(based on it being one of the three largest banks), did not consider the bank to undertake critical 
functions for the purposes of resolution, although it had been categorized by the Financial and 
Capital Market Commission of Latvia as an Other Systemically Important Institution for the purposes 
of capital buffers. 32  Likewise, the subsidiary of ABLV in Luxembourg (not listed as an Other 
Systemically Important Institution in Luxembourg) was also deemed to be failing as a consequence 
of the winding up of the parent bank but did not enter resolution under the BRRD.33 The SRB 
conclusion that it did not provide critical functions to the real economy needed to be explained with 
reference to the fact that ABLV’s principal business was with non-resident depositors. Moreover, 
the reasons for ABLV failing, as an exceptional case, should have led to both the ECB and SRB to 
explain the implicit importance of safeguarding market integrity as well as financial stability in their 
decision notices as well.34 
These cases highlight the need for reform to improve consistency and predictability of outcomes at 
the insolvency stage and minimize the risk of moral hazard ensuing in the bank sector. At this 
juncture it is too early to say that the decision on critical functions to classify a bank by the national 
designated authority as an O-SII is correlated to the resolution authority decision to take either 
resolution or insolvency when a bank is failing or likely to fail. The fact that the majority of Eurozone 
banks are less significant and Eurozone significant banks have been (and will likely be) placed in 
liquidation as oppose resolution. The political assumptions of the majority of banks are likely to 
move into resolution rather than liquidation has not materialized and so leads to a greater argument 
                                                          
30 See https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/341. 




33 https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/20180223_summary-decision_-_luxembourg.pdf.  
The Single Resolution Board does not take resolution action in relation to ABLV Bank, AS and its subsidiary 
ABLV Bank Luxembourg S.A., 24 February 2018; see further US Department of the Treasury, FinCEN Names 
ABLV Bank of Latvia an Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern and Proposes Section 311 Special 
Measure, https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-names-ablv-bank-latvia-institution-primary-
money-laundering-concern; Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 31 CFR Part 
1010 RIN 1506–AB39 Proposal of Special Measure Against ABLV Bank, AS as a Financial Institution of Primary 
Money Laundering Concern https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/federal_register_notices/2018-02-
16/2018-03214.pdf. 
34 Hence the asterisk in Table 1. 
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for common insolvency-liquidation proceedings.  Thus there is a need for a clear perimeter as to 
what bank insolvency proceedings should aim to achieve in such circumstances when safeguarding 
the portfolio of deposit-taking accounts in a timely manner and the interests of the deposit 
protection fund. However, the misalignment between resolution and liquidation proceedings 
highlights the ability of national authorities to exercise idiosyncratic liquidation processes. 
Against this background, the question remains of whether a dual-system liquidation procedure 
(administrative and court based) yields the optimal trade-off between legal certainty and cost 
effectiveness.   
 
3.1 Could a dual system be effective in the EU?  
As essentially all traditional pre-crisis means of bank insolvency procedures, be they part of general 
insolvency law or based in special banking legislation, included a moratorium or similar means to 
trigger the breakdown of contractual and economic relationships between a failing institution and 
its counterparties, it should not come as a surprise that bank insolvency management, prior to the 
implementation of modern BRRD-style resolution, was usually geared to liquidation. The modern 
concept of ‘resolution’, against this backdrop, is an alternative whose primary objective consists in 
avoiding the breakdown of critically important relationships in the interest of systemic stability, and 
which evolved in parallel to the development of large systemic international banks and highly 
interconnected money and capital markets.35  
While the BRRD itself distinguishes only between ‘resolution’ (the application of a resolution tool to 
accomplish a resolution objective) on the one hand and ‘winding up’ on the other, the analysis of 
different jurisdictions has demonstrated that there is no such thing as a universal, or even a Europe-
wide, agreed concept of what a winding up of a credit institution is, or, indeed, how it should be 
accomplished. As aptly illustrated by the pre-crisis discussion on different national approaches to 
bank insolvency management below the threshold of systemic relevance (leaving aside, for a 
moment, how and by whom this threshold would have to be defined in specific cases), consensus 
as to the relevant policy choices does not exist. Moreover, how the threshold of systemic relevance 
would be defined in specific cases is open to question. In the context of the SSM, the ECB deemed 
Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza as significant institutions.  
The lack of consensus is not just with regard to the substantive design of bank insolvency procedures, 
namely the definition of objectives to be pursued (restructuring and/or liquidation), the powers of 
relevant actors (administrative authorities, courts, liquidators, creditors’ meetings or committees), 
the substantive rights allocated to stakeholders (e.g. the ranking of claims, recognition or non-
recognition of collateral arrangements, set-off rights, etc.), and the availability of legal redress. At 
the institutional level, the lack of an EU approach also holds true for the fundamental choice 
                                                          
35 See Binder, ‘Resolution: Concepts, Requirements, Tools’, in J-H Binder and D Singh, Bank Resolution: The 
European Regime (OUP, 2016), paras 2.14–2.25. 
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between administrative and court-based procedures. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it 
appears that national approaches have been developed path-dependently, but – at least in 
jurisdictions with relevant experience of bank failures in the past (like Germany and Spain) – broadly 
compatible with national market structures and endogenous parameters, like the capability and 
reliability of the general insolvency courts. Good examples of that can be found in the cases of 
Germany and Spain, where a mistrust in the capacity of general insolvency courts to attain swift, 
effective control of an ailing institution in the early stages of the crisis led to the monopolization of 
case management within the hands of the supervisory authority, and in the case of the UK, where 
smaller banks were resolved under general insolvency law without causing major concerns prior to 
the global financial crisis.36  
In this light, the question of whether a ‘dualistic’ concept of bank insolvency management can work 
reliably must be restated. Given the residual multitude of different national approaches to dealing 
with failing banks below the ‘public interest’ threshold defined in Article 32(5) of the BRRD, euro 
area banks whose insured depositors are covered by national DGSs are expected to be mutualized 
in the context of the EDIS.37 The first question to be addressed is whether there is a need for greater 
harmonization in substantive terms, and whether this should entail a full harmonization of policy 
objectives, procedural powers, substantive rights of stakeholders and so forth, or merely 
adjustments with regard to certain technical features, such as the insolvency ranking of creditors at 
least in the euro area. Related to all this, again, is the design of the relevant institutional set-up, 
including the fundamental policy choice between administrative and court-based case management.  
If one accepts only the systemic relevance of the relevant institution or the systemic impact as the 
key determinant for the fundamental choice between alternative ‘resolution’ (as prescribed by the 
BRRD) on the one hand and liquidation in more traditional ways on the other, the first question 
turns out to be far more complex than could be expected at first sight. If a failing bank is not 
systemically important, in the sense that its (more or less) orderly exit from trading does not pose 
substantial threats to other market participants, clients, and market infrastructure within its 
domestic environment, let alone beyond its borders, the need for a harmonized, pan-European 
regime demands a careful assessment of cost and benefits undertaken during a robust resolution 
planning process. Indeed, some would argue that any attempt to prescribe a comprehensive 
concept in EU law, including full harmonization of both substantive law and institutional 
responsibilities, might risk ignoring national market infrastructures and the characteristics of 
national administrative and court infrastructures. If, for example, European law were to impose the 
duty to establish a fully harmonized lex specialis approach, with the initiation and management of 
cases entrusted exclusively to administrative resolution authorities, the benefits of such an 
approach in terms of minimization of losses and distribution of losses among creditors need to be 
                                                          
36 Campbell and Cartwright, (n 24). 
37 The EDIS will provide the respective national DGS with the funds it needs to meet its funding obligations if 
there is a payout event and/or DGS needs to contribute to a bank resolution. The payout event could be the 
result of a ‘liquidity shortfall’ or a ‘loss cover’ of the participating DGS. Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme. COM (2015)686 final. 2015/0270 (COD). Strasbourg 24.11.2015 (Article 41q). 
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assessed against the cost of stakeholders in jurisdictions with court-based or hybrid systems, who 
may initially find themselves in a much worse position than before, even though public interest 
concerns hardly require their interests to be set aside in such cases. If, by contrast (less likely), 
European law were to prescribe the duty to implement a lex generalis approach whereby all cases 
below the ‘public interest’ threshold would be subject to general insolvency law and be resolved 
through court-based insolvency procedures, this could simply reduce the effectiveness of residual 
arrangements in jurisdictions where insolvency courts cannot be relied upon to deliver adequate 
solutions.  
The option of resolution or insolvency liquidation and the importance of the integrity of the decision 
once a bank is failing are highlighted in different parts of the paper. The independence of either the 
judiciary or administrative agency is crucial to ensure the integrity of the decision and minimize the 
risk of it being influenced by political considerations. The need to structure administrative discretion 
with rules and principles has been an important way of minimizing the risks of forbearance and 
safeguarding private rights. This dualist approach will need the appropriate safeguards to ensure 
review of decisions at critical junctures to oversee their integrity and consistency of practice. To be 
sure, these considerations should not be read as providing unreserved support for the preservation 
of the status quo either. Even if the residual arrangements for bank insolvency management in all 
Member States were to be found adequate in terms of the objective of minimizing losses while 
preserving financial stability, the disparity of national regimes for dealing with banks’ bankruptcy 
within the EU could have a material impact on the financial position of national DGSs. Against this 
backdrop, further harmonization would be particularly desirable, firstly in the definition of ‘public 
interest’ and in the insolvency ranking of holders of debt instruments and the legal certainty that 
creditors face. The ‘public interest’ test as defined by Article 32(5) of the BRRD is by no means a 
clear-cut definition between the scope of BRRD-style resolution on the one hand and ‘winding up’ 
as prescribed by the respective national regimes on the other. In many respects, legal certainty for 
both the institutions and their stakeholders seems to require a much clearer definition of the 
underlying perimeter – something that the existing guidance provided by the EBA does not seem to 
provide.38 This would seem particularly problematic in cross-border cases, where the decisions 
made by home-country authorities and courts are to be recognized automatically across the EU as 
a result of the 2001 Winding-up Directive,39 in the case of branches. However, within the Banking 
Union such concerns are, for the purpose of bank resolution, mitigated through the centralization 
of decision-making procedures within the SSM and SRB. 
                                                          
38 EBA Guidelines on the application of simplified obligations under Article 4(5) of Directive 2014/59/EU. 
EBA/GL/2015/16 of July 2015. The EBA has specified mandatory and optional indicators for the criteria 
provided in Directive 2014/59/EU, while providing NCAs with the discretion with regard to the methodology 
for assessment and the related review process. 
39 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganization 
and winding up of credit institutions (OJ L 125, 5.5.2001). Note that financial institutions were excluded from 
the regulation harmonizing collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a 
debtor and the appointment of a liquidator. Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 (OJ L 160 
30.6.2000). See for further discussion in this regard J-H Binder, Cross-border Coordination of Bank Resolution 
within the EU: All Problems Resolved? ECFR (2016), at 575, 584–85. 
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Secondly, country differences to the statutory insolvency ranking of bank creditors impacts the 
levels at which impairments affect claims, providing uncertainty for investors. Directive (EU) 
2017/2399 harmonizes the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy. The 
general insolvency preference for certain uninsured depositors’ claims prescribed by that provision 
will be complemented by a new designated ranking position for holders of ‘non-preferred’ debt 
instruments issued by credit institutions, which would receive payments only after the claims of 
other creditors have been met in full. The new Directive seeks to balance out existing national 
differences in the treatment of subordinated debt instruments in bank insolvency, which in turn 
have a significant impact on the economic outcomes of bank restructuring or liquidation under 
either the BRRD ‘resolution’ framework or the applicable national bank insolvency laws. However, 
it does not go as far as the ECB suggestion, and the 2017 Directive (new Article 108) does not 
incorporate a general depositor preference rule based on a tiered approach.40 This would have 
improved application of the bail-in tool even further by enhancing ‘resolvability by clarifying the 
hierarchy of creditors and facilitating the allocation of losses to unsecured bank debt instruments 
ahead of certain operational liabilities, while alleviating concerns regarding the “no creditor worse 
off than under normal insolvency proceedings” principle’. 41  Moreover, a general depositor 
preference rule with a tiered approach would allow equal protection of insured depositors 
throughout the euro area, even in crisis-struck countries. In turn, this is consistent with the 
credibility of the euro.42  
Other differences in the hierarchy of claims in a bank insolvency are still not harmonized, for 
example with regard to the treatment of intragroup liabilities and the subordination of different 
forms of liabilities.  
The common EDIS, if adopted as proposed, will provide the respective national DGS with the funds 
it needs to meet its reimbursement obligations if there is a payout event43 and/or the DGS needs to 
contribute to a bank resolution.44 The existing proposals provide for progressive mutualization of 
contributions and an increase in the share of depositor payouts, which will be funded by EDIS; first 
as a reinsurer providing liquidity coverage, and, subject to certain conditions, as a coinsurer 
                                                          
40 ECB, Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 March 2017 on a proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the ranking of unsecured debt 
instruments in insolvency hierarchy (CON/2017/6), OJ C 132/1 of 26 April 2017, paras 1.2–1.4; see 2017/2399 
Recital 16. 
41 ibid ECB, para 1.4. 
42 See  AM Bénassy-Quéré, M Brunnermeier, H Enderlein, E Farhi, M Fratzscher, C Fuest, PO Gourinchas, P 
Martin, J Pisani-Ferry, H Rey, I Schnabel, N Véron, B Weder di Mauro and J. Zettelmeyer, Reconciling risk 
sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform, CEPR Policy Insight No. 91, Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, London, (2018). 
43 The payout event could be the result of a ‘liquidity shortfall’ or a ‘loss cover’ of the participating DGS. 
44 When using resolution tools (bail-in) for the amount of losses that covered depositors would have suffered 
if they had suffered losses in proportion to those suffered by creditors with the same level of priority (i.e. 
unsecured debt) under normal insolvency procedures. The liability of the DGS shall not exceed the losses it 
would have incurred under normal insolvency. 
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providing loss coverage to a national DGS. EDIS will be an insurance fund on which insured 
depositors of the euro area banks and other participating countries in the Banking Union will have 
a full claim.45 Disparity of national regimes for dealing with banks’ liquidation within the euro area 
(and future participating members of the Banking Union) may result in national differences in bank 
losses and the levels at which impairments affect claims having a material impact on the financial 
position of national DGSs and EDIS.46 To take an example from Germany: cooperative banks as well 
as state-owned Landesbanks and savings banks owned by local councils have traditionally been 
organized in networks that, in the event of a failure, would not pay out insured deposits but rather 
facilitate and fund the restructuring of the insolvent business, mostly in the form of an assisted 
merger with other institutions within the same network (Institutssicherung: protection of 
institutions rather than protection of deposits).47 While these arrangements are compatible with 
general EU law requirements on deposit guarantee schemes, they would be difficult to integrate 
within EDIS.  
It seems evident that fair, commonly accepted burden-sharing arrangements in cross-border 
scenarios – in the form of EDIS or otherwise – are inconceivable without further harmonization of 
bank insolvency legislation within the EU as a whole and the Banking Union in particular. In this 
context, it is important to distinguish between substantive law – including, in particular, the full 
harmonization of creditors’ rights and the hierarchy of claims in insolvency law – on the one hand 
and the institutional and procedural framework for bank liquidation on the other. While the 
centralization of bank insolvency management could contribute to internalizing the potential 
negative externalities in bank liquidation and limiting moral hazard, 48  the harmonization of 
substantive laws arguably would play an even more important role, as differences in this respect are 
probably among the most important determinant for inadequate solutions to both national and 
cross-border scenarios. Suboptimality would result from non-minimization of bank losses. Because 
EDIS should be implemented in a way that unambiguously creates equal protection for all insured 
euro area depositors, some argue namely, Bénassy-Quéré et al.,49  the pricing of country-specific 
                                                          
45  Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on completing the Banking Union. Brussels 
11.10.2017. Com (2017) 592 Final. 
46 The SRB will administer not only the SRF to ensure the effective application of the resolution tools in the 
context of a bank resolution but also EDIS. See M Nieto (2016), Bank Resolution and Mutualization in the Euro 
Area in European Economy, Banks, Regulation and the Real Sector 016.2, 131–54, http://european-
economy.eu/leading-articles/bank-resolution-and-mutualization-in-the-euro-area/. 
47 Cf: Eva Hupkes, ‘Protect functions, not institutions’ The Financial Regulator, [2004] 43-49. 
48 A common bank resolution and liquidation authority already exists in some EU countries, such as Slovenia. 
Law on Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Dissolution (ZFPPIPP) (Ur. l. RS No 
13/14 – official consolidated text and 10/15 – corr.) 
49 AM Bénassy-Quéré, M Brunnermeier, H Enderlein, E Farhi, M Fratzscher, C Fuest, PO Gourinchas, P Martin, 
J Pisani-Ferry, H Rey, I Schnabel, N Véron, B Weder di Mauro and J. Zettelmeyer, Reconciling risk sharing with 
market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform, CEPR Policy Insight No. 91, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, London, (2018) 
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risk in the calculation of insurance premiums should be based on structural indicators of creditors’ 
rights, such as the effectiveness of insolvency and foreclosure procedures. In addition to the process 
of stress testing the role of the DGS in bank resolution and insolvency.50 
3.2 Is the US administrative bank resolution system effective to facilitate international 
coordination?  
The US has long had a dual resolution process for financial companies. FDIC-insured banks are 
resolved under the FDIA. Non-bank financial companies, such as bank holding companies, were 
resolved under the Bankruptcy Code, with a few exceptions such as for insurance companies. Today, 
the FDIA remains the exclusive resolution process for FDIC-insured banks. Dodd-Frank created an 
optional dual resolution process applicable to large bank holding companies and other financial 
companies. As a result, conceptually there may be questions about how international coordination 
can be achieved given the potential application of different resolution proceedings for an FDIC-
insured bank and that bank’s parent holding company, which may or may not be subject to the FDIC-
like and administrative-led liquidation procedure.  
The FDIA applies a separate administrative insolvency process for a US-insured bank that, with the 
cooperation of the host authorities for that bank’s foreign branches, can apply to the US domestic 
and international operations of the bank. In the majority of host jurisdictions there is no required 
seizure of a foreign bank’s branches upon a receivership of the home bank if the home-country 
authority ensures that the branches meet the host-country requirements for continued operations. 
In effect, the resolution of a US bank in a cooperative way with host-country supervisors and 
resolution authorities depends on the willingness of the US FDIC to meet local branch requirements 
and the willingness of the host authorities to defer immediate action. These requirements, and the 
comparative incentives of the US and host authorities, have been the subject of extensive 
discussions over many years, but most specifically since the recent financial crisis.  
Since the financial crisis, the uncertainties inherent in a bank-specific insolvency process and in the 
optional responses of the FDIC and host authorities are the primary reasons for the focus on the 
resolution of the parent holding company under the single point of entry (SPOE) framework.  While 
an SPOE resolution of the parent holding company does not address the optionality for holding 
company resolution, it makes that optionality less problematic. It also reflects ambivalence 
regarding the appropriate role of judicial and administrative insolvency regimes of financial firms. 
This ambivalence, and the political and policy issues surrounding it, is reflected in the differences 
between OLA and the proposed Financial Choice Act. 
The principal reason why this optionality between resolution under the US Bankruptcy Code or 
resolution under OLA for SIFIs is not as troublesome today is that the US and other authorities have 
required large financial institutions to create reservoirs of bail-inable debt to permit the 
                                                          
50 EBA, Final Report, Guidelines, on stress tests of deposit guarantee schemes under Directive, 2014/49/EU, 
24 May 2016 
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recapitalization of the holding company. As a result, it can be argued that the SPOE strategy and the 
specific processes designed to implement it make the insolvency law that might apply less relevant.  
This approach to SIFI resolution is fundamentally designed to address the difficulties of international 
coordination during resolutions by making the resolution of the key subsidiaries unnecessary, and 
it is conceptually similar to bank resolution in the BRRD.  
However, political developments in the US can have a negative impact on progress. While the 
potential that Congress will repeal the OLA provisions has receded, particularly given Treasury’s 
Report, if it were to do so that action would eliminate the more harmonized insolvency framework 
that has been constructed internationally. The repeal of OLA would, arguably, call into question US 
reliability as a partner in improving resolvability. Elimination of the liquidity funding component of 
OLA – the OLF which provides a limited line of credit from the US Treasury to fund a resolution 
temporarily – likewise could undermine the US ability to resolve a SIFI that, in a crisis, could not be 
resolved under the Bankruptcy Code due to the likely absence of sufficient short-term liquidity 
resources under that law.51 The OLF – required to be repaid in full by the banking sector and not 
impose any losses on the taxpayer – may be critical to avoid a disorderly resolution. While a SPOE 
resolution for a holding company can, in theory, be implemented under the Bankruptcy Code given 
sufficient total loss-absorbing capacity and liquidity resources, and well-constructed parent–
subsidiary recapitalization frameworks, the elimination of the OLA option seems to limit flexibility 
unduly and potentially increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of future bail-outs.  
Any elimination or major modification of OLA would likely be perceived as a retrenchment by the 
US from the goal of achieving resolvability for US SIFIs under an administrative procedure – and 
likely would increase the pressure in host jurisdictions to seek to impose additional constraints (such 
as more stringent intermediate holding company specifications) and capital and liquidity 
requirements on US SIFIs so that host countries could, in theory, separately resolve those host-
country subsidiaries under the national law. This development – which is already a possibility under 
the intermediate holding company mandate in the US and the proposed requirement in the EU52 – 
will greatly increase the likelihood that any future resolution of a global SIFI will lead to separate 
resolutions in the home country and all host countries. Treasury specifically cited the potential 
responses of other countries in its Report recommending the retention of OLA. Fortunately, the 
repeal of OLA appears to be substantially less likely today.   
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
As a response to the financial crisis, European legislators took a number of steps to harmonize 
insolvency law – a difficult task, not least because of the substantial differences in the regimes and 
authorities involved. Hence a harmonized administrative crisis management regime for banks in the 
form of the BRRD was introduced, which is similar to the FDIC administrative liquidation of banks in 
                                                          
51 Authority to borrow up to US$500 billion for insurance losses from the US Treasury. 
52  Proposed Article 21(b) Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2013/36/EU. 
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the US. This will contribute to facilitate cross-border resolution of banks that operate across the 
Atlantic.  
In the EU, different national frameworks have been developed to deal with bank liquidation, and 
have been refined over time in response to the individual characteristics of the respective market 
structures, administrative (or court) infrastructures, and specific lessons learnt during individual 
incidents of bank failures. Consequently, although each system will usually be the product of a more 
or less path-dependent evolution, which may or may not entail the preservation of inefficient 
procedural or substantive solutions, the diversity of arrangements as such should be expected. In 
fact, the diversity of banking systems and administrative law traditions seems to explain, at least 
partly, the diversity of bank liquidation frameworks and the differences in their efficiency measured 
in terms of loss rates of the respective DGS.  
In particular, the diversity of existing approaches to ‘no public interest’ insolvencies creates 
problems within the euro area and future participating members of the Banking Union for three 
main reasons. First, increasing integration of the European banking and financial markets almost 
inevitably means that cross-border implications of a liquidation can, and will, arise even in cases 
involving small or medium-sized banks (e.g. runs on similar debt types in banks in other countries 
or simply debt-spread variations due to contagion). In this context, differences in residual national 
regimes could lead, inter alia, to differences in the treatment of creditors (secured or unsecured and 
even within each class, e.g. intragroup liabilities) and thus to differences in terms of economic 
outcomes, as well as to legal uncertainty, all of which contradict the very objective of an integrated 
common market for financial services. Furthermore, in the euro area the credibility of the euro relies 
on ensuring equal protection of insured depositors throughout the area, even in crisis-struck 
countries. Secondly, and more specifically, the efficiency of national regimes in dealing with bank 
insolvency will have an impact on the financial situation of national DGSs on which insured 
depositors have a claim, creating differences in liquidity and loss coverage needs of national DGSs 
(e.g. lengthy bankruptcy procedures may result in dramatic deterioration of the banks’ asset 
recovery values). The pan-European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), which by definition can 
arguably be seen as a burden-sharing arrangement based on commonly accepted principles, is 
hardly conceivable in an environment where differences in national bankruptcy administration and 
in the substantive treatment of claims in national bankruptcy laws result in substantial differences 
in terms of the economic value of a given claim against an ailing institution. Thirdly, the inefficiency 
of bank liquidation procedures to wind up the residual bank within a reasonable timeframe may 
lead to a decision by the resolution authority not to use the bridge bank resolution tool as a part of 
a reorganization procedure and avoid a situation of creating a residual bank that would be put in to 
winding up proceedings.53 Hence the effectiveness of the systemic banks’ resolution procedure 
                                                          
53 BRRD Art. 37(3)-(6). It is worth noting, in this context, that the IMF’s 2018 Financial Stability Assessment 
expressly recommends to enhance the role of bridge banks as a resolution tool also for systemically important 
financially institutions. See International Monetary Fund, “Euro Area Policies – Financial Stability Assessment” 
(27 June 2018), para. 59. See also Jens-Hinrich Binder, “The Relevance of the Resolution Tools Within the SRM”, 
European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2018 - no. 29, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3274520. 
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could depend on the harmonization of at least certain substantive aspects of banks’ liquidation to 
the highest standards.  
Annex 1: Bank insolvency in the US, Germany, the UK, and Spain: in what circumstances, 
special provisions for banks apply?  
 
United States  
The United States led the discussion during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis by advocating 
an internationally coordinated approach to resolution. Yet the US had a longstanding history of and 
extensive experience with bank failures, and was accordingly the first jurisdiction to adopt a 
comprehensive regime to manage distressed non-bank financial companies to protect financial 
stability.  
The following discussion focuses on the resolution of insured depository banks, and not large, 
complex holding companies or non-banks. As noted in the introduction, the financial crisis did lead 
to statutory changes in the US through the Dodd-Frank Act to create an optional resolution process 
for large financial companies that are not insured depository banks. The Dodd-Frank Act’s OLA is 
designed only for systemically important non-bank financial companies, such as holding companies, 
when resolution under the normal US Bankruptcy Code would potentially impair financial stability.54 
This OLA parallels many elements of the FDIA. While consistent with the FSB principles, OLA does 
include some differences from the BRRD. 
The Resolution of FDIC-Insured Banks under the FDIA 
Initiation 
An FDIC receivership would commence when an insured depository’s chartering authority, for 
example the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or a state banking department, issues 
an order closing the institution (i.e. revoking its charter to operate as a depository institution) and 
appointing the FDIC as receiver.55 The appropriate federal banking agency, after consultation with 
the state regulator, may also appoint the FDIC as receiver if a state-chartered depository institution 
is undercapitalized or critically undercapitalized and it is necessary to fulfil the purposes of the 
prompt corrective action requirements.56 
The FDIC has authority to close a bank and appoint itself as its receiver under certain circumstances. 
The latter option, however, is rarely used; the more common process would be for the bank to be 
closed by the OCC and for the FDIC to be appointed as the receiver. The OCC and the FDIC have 
broad discretion to initiate resolution based on numerous grounds, including insolvency, insufficient 
liquidity, unsafe or unsound condition, and substantial dissipation of assets or earnings. Further, 
                                                          
54 Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a special insolvency regime under OLA for SIFIs, including bank 
holding companies and non-bank financial companies such as insurance brokers and dealers. 
5512 U.S.C. § 1821(c). 
5612 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(9). 
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regulators need not wait until the bank is actually insolvent but can initiate resolution if the bank is 
likely to fail. 
To provide additional time to complete a resolution and reduce interruptions in the provision of 
banking services, banks are generally placed in receivership at the close of business on a Friday, and 
the FDIC then executes a resolution strategy.  
Moratorium 
Like OLA, under the FDIA counterparties to qualified financial contracts (QFCs) are stayed from 
closing out their contracts for one business day, during which time the receiver may transfer QFCs 
to a bridge financial company or third party.57 Counterparties to transferred QFCs are prohibited 
from closing out based solely on the appointment of a receiver or the transfer of their QFCs. In 
exercising its power to transfer QFCs, the FDIC as receiver must transfer all contracts between the 
failed financial company and a counterparty (and all of the counterparty's affiliates), or transfer no 
such QFCs. In other words, the receiver cannot ‘cherry pick’ certain QFCs to transfer. 
- Management of the insolvency process 
The FDIC is granted broad discretion in exercising its authority under the FDIA bank insolvency 
regime. To ensure that the actions taken by the FDIC to resolve a failed bank are decisive and final, 
the FDIA limits judicial supervision of FDIC resolutions. The FDIC is granted authority to establish the 
method by which creditors file claims and to adjudicate the claims submitted. After all 
administrative procedures have been exhausted, claimants are entitled to de novo review of their 
claims by a court. The FDIA also restricts the jurisdiction of courts to hear any claim or action for 
payment from, or any action seeking determination of rights of the assets of, an insured depository 
institution for which the FDIC has been appointed as a receiver, or any claim related to the acts or 
omissions of the FDIC or the failed bank. Further, courts are prohibited from attaching or executing 
on assets. When courts have reviewed the FDIC’s actions in connection with bank resolutions, they 
have tended to enforce the statutory limitations on the courts’ jurisdiction and defer to the FDIC’s 
judgement.58  
Resolutions under the FDIA are funded by the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). To preserve the DIF, 
when resolving a failed bank the FDIC is required to adopt a resolution strategy that resolves the 
bank (including its subsidiaries) separately from its parent company, and resolves its deposit-taking 
operations, core business lines, and major assets in a manner that creates the least cost to the DIF 
of all possible methods for resolving the bank. The FDIC can depart from this requirement only if the 
‘least costly’ resolution would have ‘serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial 
stability’ and an alternative resolution would ‘avoid or mitigate such adverse effects’.59 Permission 
to exceed this ‘least costly’ requirement must be approved by the Secretary of the US Treasury 
                                                          
57 See 12 U.S.C. §1821(e)(8). 
58 12 U.S.C. §§1821(d) and (e), 1823. 
5912 U.S.C § 1823(c)(4)(G). 
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following recommendations from a two-thirds majority of the FDIC Board and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Priorities, collateral, and set-off 
In general, as receiver the FDIC succeeds to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the institution 
involved and of any stockholder, member, depositor, officer, or director. In an FDIA receivership of 
the bank, secured creditors would recover to the extent of the collateral. FDIC resolution gives 
payment priority to depositors, including the FDIC as subrogee, over general unsecured creditors. 
Therefore, in an FDIC receivership, creditors recover in the following order:  
• the receiver for its administrative expenses; 
• depositors, including the FDIC as subrogee for insured depositors and uninsured depositors;  
• general creditors; 
• subordinated corporate debt holders; and  
• shareholders.60 
Secured creditors receive payment through the pledged collateral up to the market value of the 
collateral and, as a result, receive payment outside the foregoing priorities. If there is an 
uncollateralized portion of their claim, that portion would be paid in the order of the claim – so an 
uncollateralized general creditor claim would be subordinated to administrative expenses and 
depositor claims.  
Insured depositors receive access to their deposits virtually overnight after the appointment of the 
receiver, typically through the transfer of insured deposits to another FDIC-insured bank or through 
other arrangements made by the FDIC; only rarely are deposits paid out of the DIF in a liquidation.  
The FDIC may take over the assets and operate the institution involved, collect all obligations and 
money due to the institution, perform all functions consistent with its appointment, and preserve 
and conserve the assets of the institution. The FDIC may merge the institution with another bank or 
transfer its assets and liabilities to another entity.61 The transferee may be another bank or a bridge 
bank62 created and managed by the FDIC to provide continuity and help maximize the value of the 
failed bank’s assets where an immediate sale of the assets and liabilities to another bank is not 
possible.63 
Creditors are also assured that they will receive no less than they would have recovered in a 
liquidation of the bank.64  
                                                          
6012 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11). 
6112 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G). 
62See 436 BPS §IV-D8, Description of the receivership process. 
6312 U.S.C. § 1821(n). 
64 12 U.S.C. §1821(i). This provision is structured in a confusing manner, but the effect is that creditors are 
guaranteed to receive no less than they would have if the FDIC had immediately liquidated the bank and not 
used its authority to create a bridge bank or other non-liquidation resolution method. 
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Unlike OLA, the FDIA does not include a specific provision protecting a creditor’s right to set-off. 
However, set-off will apply in FDIC bank receiverships generally under the same principles and 
requirements applicable to set-off claims under state law. One important note is that, as under 
common law, an enforceable right to set-off requires that the claims be mutual as to both identity 
of the parties and priority of payment. As a result, the priority given to depositor claims, which 
includes the FDIC’s right to recover funds expended by the DIF to protect insured depositors, may 
impair the rights of a general creditor seeking recovery against the FDIC.  
Pre-insolvency 
The FDIA requires certain federal regulatory responses when an insured institution’s regulatory 
capital ratio falls below specified levels. This mandatory supervisory structure is intended to 
facilitate resolution of the problems of insured institutions at the least cost to the DIF by requiring 
the regulators to take ‘prompt corrective action’. 65  Final planning and marketing for a bank 
resolution normally begins 90–100 days prior to the institution being placed into receivership, 
though the process may be accelerated in the event of a sudden failure. It begins when an FDIC-
insured bank’s problems appear to be severe enough to cause it potentially to fail. During this period 
the FDIC coordinates its actions – including the scheduling of the failure – with other regulators. 
When a bank becomes critically undercapitalized under the prompt corrective action standards,66 
the primary federal regulator has up to 90 days to close the institution and appoint the FDIC as 
receiver. The FDIC and the primary federal regulator generally require that the institution seek an 
acquirer or merger partner to avoid the necessity for appointment of the FDIC as receiver. The FDIC’s 
authority to take over a failed or failing institution, thereby imposing the bank’s losses on its 
stockholders and unsecured and uninsured creditors, not only provides an incentive for 
management to seek actively for an acquirer, but also encourages the institution’s board of directors 
to approve (or recommend for approval to shareholders) such transactions to avoid the risk of an 
FDIC receivership. 
During this planning phase, the FDIC collects as much information as possible about the institution 
and structures the resolution transaction. This information assists the FDIC in determining the best 
transaction structures to offer potential acquirers. The FDIC also values the institution’s assets and 
determines which assets may be particularly problematic for an acquiring institution and may need 
to remain in the receivership for disposition after resolution or be covered by some level of risk 
protection. Qualified bidders are contacted to perform due diligence, subject to a confidentiality 
agreement. Due diligence is offered both onsite and offsite through the use of secure internet data 
rooms. Bidders are then asked to submit bids on the basis of the transaction structures offered by 
the FDIC. The FDIC analyses the bids received and accepts the bid that resolves the failed institution 
in the manner least costly to the DIF.  
                                                          
65See FDIA § 38(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a). 
66 12 U.S.C. § 1831. 
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Then, whenever possible at the point of failure, the institution is placed into receivership and then, 
if possible, immediately sold – with the sale resulting in a transfer of deposits and assets that renders 
the process seamless to insured depositors and, where the acquirer assumes those liabilities, 
uninsured depositors. The FDIC is also able to make an immediate payment, or advance dividend, 
on the obligations to uninsured creditors not assumed by the acquiring institution based upon 
estimated recoveries from the liquidation.  
Alternatively, the FDIC may charter one or more bridge banks to which assets and liabilities of an 
insured bank may be transferred in the event of its failure. Fundamental to orderly resolution of 
more complex banks is the ability to continue key operations, services, and transactions that will 
maximize the value of the bank’s assets. The bridge bank is a newly established national bank that 
permits the FDIC to stabilize the key operations of the covered financial company by continuing 
valuable operations. 
Legal certainty 
Legal certainty under the FDIA is provided by a statutory priority for distribution in the receivership, 
the defined powers for the resolution, the administrative claims process, and, following exhaustion 
of its remedies, the right to file a lawsuit on any claims. 
Timeliness 
The FDIA helps facilitate more timely resolutions of failing banks, but like any relatively discretionary 
process it does rely on the diligence of supervisory agencies and their willingness to act promptly. 
The process is described above under ‘pre-insolvency’. 
Once a resolution is initiated, the FDIA authorizes the FDIC to take immediate action to resolve the 
bank and does not require, in general, additional permissions to act. As a result, the FDIC typically 
makes an immediate transfer of most of the failed bank’s assets and liabilities to another open bank 
or a bridge bank.  
Germany 
In Germany the legal environment for the management of distress banks is complex due to special 
regimes introduce both during and after the global financial crisis. Effectively, following BRRD 
implementation, the procedural framework has now adopted a dualistic structure, with the 
traditional pre-crisis hybrid combination of administrative measures and court-based liquidation still 
in place for cases outside the scope of the BRRD (i.e. failures which would not give rise to systemic 
stability concerns and therefore would not satisfy the ‘public interest’ test under the BRRD67), while 
the BRRD has been transposed in the form of a separate German Recovery and Resolution Act, the 
                                                          
67 See supra, text and n. [xxx]. 
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Sanierungs und Abwicklungsgesetz.68 The existing crisis management measures under the German 
Banking Act69 were migrated into the German Recovery and Resolution Act, while the German Bank 
Restructuring Act70 remains in force. 
Initiation 
For banks outside the scope of single supervision by the ECB, the initiation of insolvency procedures 
remains reserved to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht or BaFin).71 This restriction has been in place since the fundamental 
reform of bank insolvency management in the aftermath of the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1976. 
It precludes petitions by the bank company, its owners, and creditors. Whereas directors of 
companies facing illiquidity or balance-sheet insolvency are required by statute to file for 
insolvency72 this duty is replaced by a duty to inform BaFin.73 In order to preserve the supervisor’s 
full autonomy as to if and when to initiate formal court-sanctioned insolvency procedures. 
Moratorium 
Since the 1976 reforms responding to lessons learnt from the Herstatt failure, an ‘administrative 
moratorium’ has been the key instrument applied in all cases of bank insolvencies. Physical closure 
is combined with the closure of the relevant bank and all its branches, with a ban on disposals and 
payments, a stay of enforcement proceedings, and a prohibition to accept new deposits, as well as 
directions to managers and, where deemed necessary, the removal of managers and their 
replacement by trustworthy external staff.74 The imposition of such measures effectively triggers 
broadly similar consequences as would be associated with procedural safeguards for the insolvent 
estate during the initial stages of formal insolvency proceedings.75 The application of the German 
Restructuring Act is followed by a mandatory stay until the end of the next business day.76 
Management of the insolvency process 
Under the traditional regime, the management of the insolvency process is confined to BaFin as the 
supervisory authority as long as formal insolvency procedures have not yet been initiated. Once 
                                                          
68 Gesetz zur Sanierung und Abwicklung von Instituten und Finanzgruppen [Law on the Restructuring and 
Liquidation of Credit Institutions and Financial Groups], 10 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt [Official 
Journal] 2014 I, 2091. See e.g. J-H Binder, Germany, in G Moss, B Wessels, and M Haentjens (eds), European 
Banking and Insurance Insolvency, 2nd edn, OUP 2017. 
69 Kreditwesengesetz of 9 September 1998 (as amended), Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2776. 
70 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten (KredReorgG) of 9 December 2010, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 
1900. 
71 German Banking Act, section 46b(1), sentence 2. 
72 German Insolvency Act, section 15a. 
73 German Banking Act, section 46b(1), sentence 4. 
74 German Banking Act, section 46(1). 
75 Cf. German Insolvency Act, sections 19–20, and, for a functional analysis of the parallels between the two 
regimes, J-H Binder, supra n. 24, at 255–60. 
76 KredReorgG, section 13. 
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BaFin has filed for insolvency under section 46b of the German Banking Act, the responsibility shifts 
to the insolvency court and the liquidator appointed by it under general insolvency law. In practice, 
this has happened only following the imposition of an ‘administrative moratorium’ in the sense 
explained above, which may take between a few days and a few months, depending on the size of 
the relevant institution, the complexity of its organization, its financial position vis-à-vis clients and 
professional counterparties, etc. Effectively, the imposition of a moratorium prior to the initiation 
of a formal insolvency procedure thereby secures a dominant position of BaFin during the initial 
stage of a bank crisis. This stage is particularly important in that following the imposition of the 
moratorium, insured depositors will have been paid off,77 close-out and netting rights will have been 
invoked, and collateral rights will have been enforced before the insolvency court takes over. 
Although modern German insolvency law does provide for rather flexible, court-sanctioned 
restructuring procedures (including a debtor-in-possession procedure),78 the function of insolvency 
procedures for credit institutions has effectively been confined to providing a procedural framework 
for the collection and distribution of assets and the dissolution of the insolvent company. In this 
process, case management is governed exclusively by general insolvency law, leaving the technical 
liquidation process to a court-appointed liquidator with some oversight by the insolvency judge and 
a creditors’ meeting.79 During this process, BaFin has special information rights under section 46b 
(3) of the Banking Act, but otherwise no control of the procedure and the economic implications. 
Priorities, collateral, and set-off 
As a rule, priorities, collateral, and set-off rights are governed by general insolvency law, set out in 
the German Insolvency Act.80 In principle, subject to voidability of onerous transactions,81 collateral 
arrangements are respected in insolvency and will lead to preferential treatment of the respective 
creditor. The Financial Collateral Directive applies, as is the case in all EU countries. Likewise, a set-
off right that has arisen prior to the initiation of the insolvency proceedings will continue to be 
exercisable. In this context, close-out netting arrangements have been accorded special protection 
under section 104(4) of the German Insolvency Act, which gives effect to contractual arrangements 
that deviate from the otherwise mandatory set-off rules under the German Insolvency Act.  
On reflection, the German regime clearly demonstrates that exceptions to general insolvency 
principles on the grounds of systemic stability do not inevitably warrant the creation of a fully 
                                                          
77 Depositors are entitled to a pay-out of insured deposits if an administrative moratorium under section 46(1) 
of the Banking Act has been in force for a period of more than six weeks at the latest, cf. section 10(2), 
sentence 2 of the German Einlagensicherungsgesetz (Deposit Insurance Act). In the past the declaration that 
the relevant institution is unable to meet its obligations to depositors, which gives rise to an immediate claim 
for pay-out of insured deposits (cf. section 10(2), sentence 1 of the Deposit Insurance Act), has frequently 
coincided with the imposition of the moratorium. 
78  See German Insolvency Act, Part VI (‘Insolvenzplanverfahren’, modelled after Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code) and Part VII (‘Eigenverwaltung’, a debtor-in-possession procedure). 
79 See, in particular, German Insolvency Act, sections 56–79. 
80 See, in particular, German Insolvency Act, sections 48–46 (ranking of claims), sections 46–52 (safeguards 
with respect to specific categories of rights in rem), and 94–96 (insolvency set-off). 
81 See German Insolvency Act, sections 129–s47. 
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separate procedural framework. The very fact that the relevant provisions have been included in 
the general insolvency law framework rather than in the Banking Act (which merely refers to the 
Insolvency Act in this respect) clearly illustrates that substantive (as distinct from procedural) 
general insolvency law is generally capable of accommodating the specific characteristics of bank 
insolvency. 
Recently, the principle of general applicability of the Insolvency Act has been modified slightly, with 
the introduction of a new insolvency preference for depositors in section 46f(4) no 2 of the Banking 
Act (transposing BRRD Article 108) as well as preferential treatment of non-bail-inable creditors 
pursuant to section 46f(5)–(7) of the Banking Act, which modifies the general ranking of claims 
under section 38 of the German Insolvency Act for that purpose. The effect is subordination of 
unsecured bondholders, thereby facilitating bail-in, i.e. statutory subordination. 
Pre-insolvency 
Owing to the hybrid combination of the ‘administrative moratorium’ and the application of general 
insolvency law described above, there is no clear-cut pre-insolvency stage that could be 
distinguished from the actual insolvency situation. It should be noted, however, that the German 
Banking Act has always provided for a number of instruments for use ahead of the outright 
imposition of a moratorium, by way of early intervention as soon as a particular credit institution 
has been identified as encountering financial problems or irregularities. Pursuant to the relevant 
provisions, BaFin may, inter alia, issue directions to the relevant institution and its management, 
prohibit or restrict the payout of dividends, restrict the provision of new loans, appoint a special 
investigator, and prohibit or restrict the activities of directors.82 
Legal certainty 
Unlike early-intervention measures, which are addressed exclusively to the relevant institution and 
are confidential, the imposition of an administrative moratorium is made public immediately. The 
legal consequences are set out directly in the Banking Act and not determined on a discretionary 
basis, so both the institution itself and its counterparties can expect no lesser degree of legal 
certainty than they would enjoy following the initiation of general insolvency provisions, even 
though – unlike in formal insolvency – they are not party to the proceedings during the moratorium 
stage. Once BaFin has formally filed for the opening of insolvency proceedings under section 46b of 
the Banking Act (discussed above), all stakeholders are subject to the rules of general insolvency 
law, which ensure a high level of creditor information as well as influence on the decision-making 
process. Just as in ordinary corporate insolvency cases, the liquidator exercises his/her duties in the 
interest of the creditors as a whole, is accountable to the court and the creditors’ meeting, and can 
be held liable for breach of duties. All in all, this leaves the creditors in a substantially more 
comfortable position than they would be in a purely administrative procedure, especially in a BRRD-
                                                          
82 See for details German Banking Act, sections 45, 45c, and 46. 
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style environment where the resolution authority has a high level of discretion with regard to the 
design of individual resolution actions. 
Timeliness 
The need to ensure effective, swift responses to problem cases was one of the reasons for the 
adoption of the traditional hybrid style of bank insolvency management in Germany in the 
aftermath of the Herstatt case. With the monopolization of the right to initiate liquidation 
procedures in the hands of the supervisory authority, coupled with the introduction of the 
‘administrative moratorium’ as a rather forceful, comprehensive instrument to preserve the 
relevant bank’s financial position and cut off dealings with third parties, the expectation was that 
the risk of a dramatic deterioration of the bank’s financial position once it was found to be in trouble 
could be effectively stopped, while avoiding the time-consuming initiation procedure under general 
insolvency law until the situation could be stabilized. This was also attributable to the fact that there 
are no specialized insolvency courts in the German judiciary, so swift, competent and effective 
responses to the highly dynamic developments in the early stages of bank insolvency cases could 
not reliably be expected under general law. Judging from probably more than 300 cases to date, 
where an administrative moratorium was imposed and followed by the liquidation of the relevant 
bank under general insolvency law, this appears to have been broadly successful. 
 UK 
The special resolution regime applicable to banks was introduced in 2008 to address the failure of 
Northern Rock. Initially an intermediate regime, it was transformed into a permanent resolution 
regime in 2009. It subsequently has been subjected to a series of reforms, culminating in an 
adaptation to the resolution framework envisaged by the BRRD. Thus, in contrast to the BRRD, the 
UK regime still contains substantial differences relating to the approach to resolution, as well as 
additional special insolvency and administration procedures.83  
Initiation 
The UK has put in place special administration and insolvency arrangements for banks, investment 
banks, and building societies. These measures enable the UK to put into insolvency those banks 
where it is not in the public interest to initiate the Special Resolution Regime.84 Part 2 of the Banking 
Act 2009 is concerned with the winding up of a bank based on the existing compulsory winding-up 
process for commercial companies, and is supplemented by the Bank Insolvency (England & Wales) 
Rules 2009. The process of applying for a bank insolvency order is modified as compared with the 
rules that apply in the normal procedures so there can be a court hearing without delay. There are 
three grounds for an application for an insolvency order in respect of a bank: the bank is unable to 
                                                          
83 R Olivares-Caminal, J Douglas, R Guyn, A Kornberg, S Paterson, and D Singh, Debt Restructuring 2edn (OUP 
2016) Part II Bank Resolution, 361–483. 
84 M Cohen and S Crooks, Bank Failures under the Banking Act 2009 (2012) 9(2) International Corporate Rescue 
127. 
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pay or likely to become unable to pay its debts; it is in the public interest to wind up the bank; and 
it is fair to wind up the bank. 
An application to court under the Banking Act to appoint a person as liquidator can be made by the 
Bank of England, the appropriate regulator, or the Secretary of State. Where an insolvency order is 
sought the court may only, exercising its discretion, make an order in respect of a bank if the court 
is satisfied that the bank has ‘eligible depositors’, i.e. depositors eligible for compensation under the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). 
Moratorium 
To address the risk following disorderly early termination of transactions and enforcement of 
security rights, Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 provided for a moratorium. As a consequence, 
if a counterparty sought to enforce its contractual rights, it required the consent of HM Treasury. 
Failure to obtain the required consent resulted in the purported enforcement action becoming void. 
This tool was maintained until the introduction of the BRRD. Today it subsists as part of the Bank 
Insolvency Procedure and the Bank Administration Procedure, which include a power to put in place 
a moratorium procedure to manage creditors’ interests in as orderly manner as possible and 
minimize disruption of the bank’s vital functions.  
Management of the insolvency process 
The objectives of the insolvency and administration procedures are aligned with that of resolution; 
hence the objectives of rehabilitation of the debtor and satisfaction of creditor claims are 
subordinated to financial stability. After the application of transfer, the residual institution shall 
support the transferee or continue functions and services that are deemed essential to avert the 
further deterioration of financial market stability. In addition, the UK has in place a special bank 
insolvency procedure, modified to ensure eligible depositors are paid promptly under the FSCS.  
The bank liquidator, who is an officer of the court, has two objectives. Objective 1 is to ensure that 
each eligible depositor has its account transferred to another financial institution or receives 
payment from the FSCS as soon as practicable. Objective 2 is to wind up the affairs of the bank so 
as to achieve the best result for the bank’s creditors as a whole. Although the bank liquidator is 
required to begin working towards both objectives, Objective 1 ‘takes precedence’ over Objective 
2. To achieve the liquidator’s objectives the bank is expected to have in place a file recording 
depositors’ information consistently in a ‘single customer view’, which the bank liquidator is 
required to review before transferring the information to the UK FSCS for it to initiate payouts to 
customers of the bank. The general powers and duties of the liquidator are set out in section 103 of 
the Banking Act, which lists, with only minor modifications, the main provisions of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 that apply to non-banks. The members of the liquidation committee will be nominees of 
the Bank, the appropriate regulator, and the FSCS, and the liquidator is required to report to this 
committee. 
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Priorities, collateral, and set-off 
Set-off has a longstanding tradition in English insolvency law. The underlying policy reason is that it 
would be inequitable if one were to enforce a claim without giving due regard to the obligation. 
Hence it would be inequitable for the liquidator or administrator to enforce all claims while 
disclaiming all obligations. This principle can be found in the inherent equitable jurisdiction of the 
courts. Here courts can apply set-off even without prior satisfaction of the strict requirements under 
the Insolvency Rules 2016, such as mutuality.85 In contrast to German, Spanish, and US law, English 
law does not contemplate the prohibition of ipso facto clauses, i.e. clauses which allow termination 
upon imminent or actual insolvency. Hence to the extent that contractual provisions, e.g. found in 
collateral arrangements, are not prejudicial to the debtor or fellow creditors and thus subject to the 
voidance rules, set-off is enforceable in accordance with the terms of the arrangement. It is said 
that although legislators have implemented the Financial Collateral Directive by way of the Financial 
Collateral Arrangement (No 2) Regulations 2003, the actual effect is negligible in relation to 
enforcement of collateral.86 
Hence creditors subject to a set-off or collateral arrangement are loosely said to benefit from a 
higher priority. Given the policy reason set out above, set-off and collateral arrangements are 
accorded wide discretion, such that they can be largely enforced notwithstanding an imminent or 
actual commencement of a conventional insolvency or administration proceeding.  
Pre-insolvency 
The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and in certain circumstances the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) are responsible for making the determination that a banking institution or an 
investment firm is failing, or is likely to fail to satisfy the threshold conditions, and that it is not 
reasonably likely that action will be taken by or in respect of the institution that will enable the 
institution to meet those conditions. In this regard, options set out in the recovery plan are likely to 
be initiated. The PRA has introduced the Proactive Intervention Framework to explain the structure 
of its supervisory decision-making process as its judgement about a firm’s viability changes and it 
considers the firm to be near ‘proximity to failure’.87 
                                                          
85 Mutuality means that the claims and obligations must be reciprocal between two parties. The underlying 
policy rationale is that one’s assets cannot be used to satisfy a third party’s claims.  
86 However, there are benefits related to perfection, substitution, and appropriation of collateral. Discussion 
of the benefits is beyond the scope of this paper.  
87 The Proactive Intervention Framework is set out in five stages: Stage 1 – Low risk to viability of firm; Stage 
2 – Moderate risk to viability of firm; Stage 3 – Risk to viability absent action by the firm; Stage 4 – Imminent 
risk to viability of firm; Stage 5 – Firm in resolution or being actively wound up. 
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In some respects the Special Resolution Regime Code of Practice 2017 confers on the PRA and the 
FCA wider discretion to determine whether an institution is failing or likely to fail by eliminating the 
need to determine this with reference solely to the threshold conditions.88  
Timeliness 
The automation of information on single customer views and exclusions within 24 hours provides 
the basis for a firm to be able to transfer eligible deposits to achieve the desired stabilization option 
or administration. 
The Banking Act 2009 also confers some additional express powers on the bank liquidator: the 
power to insure the business and property of the bank, the power to do all such things (including 
carrying out of works) as may be necessary for the realization of the property of the bank, and the 
power to make any payment which is necessary or incidental to the performance of the liquidator’s 
business. The implication of the addition of these express powers is that the legislature has taken 
the view that the powers do not fall within the liquidator’s general powers, in a normal liquidation, 
to carry on the business of a company so far as may be necessary for its beneficial winding up or the 
power to do all such things as may be necessary for winding up the company’s affairs and 
distributing its assets. The bank liquidator may not apply to the court for directions in relation to 
any particular matter arising in the winding up, and a person aggrieved by an act or decision of the 
bank liquidator may not apply to the court unless the liquidation committee has passed a full 
payment resolution, i.e. until the committee has resolved that Objective 1 (ensure that each eligible 
depositor receives payment from the FSCS as soon as practicable) has been achieved insofar as is 
reasonably practicable. 
 Legal certainty  
In view of the policy reason set out above, set-off and collateral arrangements are accorded wide 
discretion, such that they can be largely enforced notwithstanding an imminent or actual 
commencement of a conventional insolvency or administration proceeding. Section 112 of the 
Financial Markets and Services Act 2000 represents a significant exemption, since it allows the UK 
regulator to stay and suspend any agreement. However, it does not enable the regulator to tear up 
contracts.  
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 Spain89 
As is the case in Germany, with the transposition of the BRRD to the Spanish law in 201590 the bank 
insolvency process became a dual system: an administrative process to deal with bank recovery and 
resolution in the context of the Single Resolution Mechanism, and a court-based process 91  in 
conjunction with administrative measures to deal with bank liquidation. As it is the case in Germany, 
some special legislation applies to dealing with insolvent banks in Spain.  
Initiation 
Initiation of insolvency proceedings is part of the role of the supervisor (the ECB for significant 
institutions and the Bank of Spain for less significant institutions). Also, the ‘debtor’ credit institution 
is entitled to petition for insolvency proceedings to be opened, and is obliged to communicate to 
the bank supervisor. If bank liquidation under normal insolvency proceedings is feasible and credible, 
the Bank of Spain (less significant institutions) sets the conditions within three months of the date 
of the formal petition.92 The Ministry of Economy has the power to decide its participation in the 
bank liquidation based on the public interest. The court has to examine the petition to declare the 
insolvency proceedings open and decide on their admissibility.93 In Spain, the legal right to close a 
bank is reserved to the court. The legislation does not define a closure rule, but defines the grounds 
that trigger the proceedings on which parties are entitled to initiate such proceedings, and on which 
judicial authority is in charge. 
Moratorium 
The opening of insolvency proceedings alone has no effect on the validity of contracts with pending 
reciprocal obligations. Moratorium and suspension of contracts are provided upon application to a 
bankruptcy court. The moratorium (full or partial suspension of payments and a stay of contract 
enforcement) is necessary to protect depositors and avoid dissipation of financial resources or the 
legal process of seizing property by certain creditors to the detriment of others. 
Management of the insolvency process 
Once the supervisor sets the conditions for liquidation, the process is managed by the court under 
the General Insolvency Act,94 which acknowledges (Additional Provision 2) the specialties for bank 
                                                          
89 For a historical perspective of corporate bankruptcy procedures in Spain see Van Hemmen (2007–2014): 
Estadística concursal. Anuario 2006. Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad y Mercantiles de España, 
Madrid 
90 Legal Act 11/2015, 18 June, on Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms. 
91  Act 22/2003, 9 April, on Insolvency, amended by Act 9/2015, 26 May, on Urgent Measures regarding 
Insolvency and Act 6/2005, 22 April, on Restructuring and Winding-up of Credit Institutions. 
92 Legal Act 11/2015, Additional Provision 15. 
93 Once the court has adopted a preliminary decision, it notifies the Bank of Spain and the National Stock 
Exchange Commission requesting a list of the payment and clearing systems for securities and derivate 
financial instruments to which the affected firm belongs. 
94  Act 22/2003, 9 April, on Insolvency, amended by Act 9/2015, 26 May, on Urgent Measures regarding 
Insolvency (Title II). 
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insolvency situations established in specific legislation for banks: ‘except those related to the 
composition, the appointment and operation of the insolvency practitioner under insolvency law 
(bankruptcy receiver)’. Once the insolvency proceedings are declared open, the court appoints the 
insolvency practitioner (receiver) to coordinate the liquidation process (e.g. paying employees, 
partial payment of claims) and reduce the information asymmetries between creditors and debtors. 
The court decides on the insolvency practitioner’s status, sets out its legal powers and its exercise 
thereof, the giving of accounts, and, when appropriate, its liability. All creditors, ordinary or 
otherwise and whatever their nationality, are entitled to be represented in the bankruptcy 
procedure. Creditors are integrated de jure in the aggregate liabilities of the insolvency proceeding, 
with no exceptions other than those established in law. Disagreements among creditors (e.g. 
inclusion or exclusion of claims, or the amount or ranking of those claims) are dealt with by the court. 
Hence the management of the bank liquidation process is governed by the general insolvency law, 
and specific legislation for banks covers, in particular, rights in rem (i.e. property rights) and certain 
set-off and close-out netting arrangements and collateral arrangements. 
Priorities, collateral, and set-off 
Once insolvency proceedings are initiated, the general insolvency law does not allow set-off in 
an ordinary insolvency procedure.95  However, under the special regime applicable to credit 
institutions, investment service companies, and insurance undertakings, set-off rights that have 
arisen prior the declaration of insolvency will continue to be exercisable (Additional Provision 
2).96 
Also, the EU harmonized regime applies to financial collateral and is enshrined in the Insolvency 
Act, which protects against potential negative economic consequences (e.g. securing the 
continuity of the creditor’s activity) in the initial stage prior to the formal opening of insolvency 
proceedings and in the course of the proceedings. The special regime applicable to credit 
institutions envisages that the enforcement of property rights recorded in a register, account, or 
centralized deposit system located in Spain is governed by Spanish law (lex rei sitae).97 
For banks, the 2015 Law that transposes the BRRD into the Spanish legal framework introduced 
a tiered depositor preference regime in which insured depositors rank higher than eligible 
deposits, but uninsured deposits still rank higher than other short-term liabilities.98 The 2015 
Law also introduces a tiered preferential treatment of “‘subordinated claims,” according to 
which subordinated debt holders rank higher than Additional Tier 1 or Additional Tier 2 capital 
holders. 99 
                                                          
95 ibid Article 58. 
96 ibid.  
97 Act 6/2005 on Restructuring and Winding-up of Credit Institutions, Article 8.1(d) and (e). 
98 Act 11/2015, 18 June, on Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms. 
99 Ibid (Additional Disposition 14th). 
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Pre-insolvency 
For banks outside the scope of single supervision by the ECB, the Bank of Spain has at its disposal a 
large variety of tools for intervention.100 In particular, supervisors have the ability to place the 
management of a distressed bank under the control of appointed officials (interventores) in 
extremely grave circumstances (other than those envisaged in Act 11/2015 on Recovery and 
Resolution of Credit Institutions) in which ‘stability, liquidity or solvency’ is jeopardized.101 
The Bank of Spain, as bank supervisor, has broad authority to take remedial action, about which it 
should inform the government and the resolution authority (FROB).102 The agreement to intervene 
and replace one, more, or all members of the board of directors could be ex officio or at the instance 
of the bank’s management or internal control body. The agreement is made public in the Official 
Gazette. Any action taken without the prior approval of the interventores is considered null and void. 
The Bank of Spain is fully responsible for modifying and ceasing intervention and substitution 
measures for non-significant banks. If a bank cannot be made viable under provisional 
administration, the alternative is liquidation. The bank may also voluntarily decide to be liquidated. 
The court will inform the Bank of Spain (or the ECB) and FROB of this decision. The Bank of Spain 
and FROB decide whether the bank will be subject to resolution or liquidation, and inform the court 
within seven days.103 In the latter case, the court-based bankruptcy procedure is set in motion. 
Legal certainty 
In ordinary bankruptcy procedure bank creditors’ agreement or composition is legally binding on 
ordinary and subordinated creditors holding claims that take priority when insolvency proceedings 
are declared open. 104  Claims held by creditors who have voted in favour of the composition 
(preferential, ordinary, and subordinated) are extinguished for the part covered by the write-down 
of debts and postponed by the moratorium on payment. Although a straight priority of claims 
applies in liquidation, creditors participate in a renegotiation of their claims,105 the outcome of 
which can be challenged by any creditor subject to court approval. 
                                                          
100 Provisional administration in the pre-insolvency phase is regulated by Law 10/2014 on the Regulation, 
Supervision and Soundness of Credit Institutions, Chapter V, Articles 70–79. 
101 Ibid. 
102 The Bank of Spain is responsible for ‘preventive’ resolution authority and FROB is responsible for the 
execution of resolution schemes. The Bank of Spain is responsible of the preparation phase, which includes 
the drafting of bank resolution plans in cooperation with the Single Resolution Board. ibid Article 2.1(c). 
103 Law 10/2014 on the Regulation, Supervision and Soundness of Credit Institutions, Article 77. The Bank of 
Spain reports annually to the Spanish Parliament on its regulatory intervention and resolution measures. The 
Ministry of Economy has the power to intervene in bank liquidation based on the public interest. Act 11/2015, 
18 June, on Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, Additional Provision 15. 
104 Certain majorities are required for creditors to accept a proposal for composition. Act 22/2003, 9 April, on 
Insolvency, amended by Act 9/2015, 26 May, on Urgent Measures regarding Insolvency, Article 124.1. 
105 Act 22/2003, 9 April, on Insolvency, amended by Act 9/2015, 26 May, on Urgent Measures regarding 
Insolvency, Title IV, Chapter IV and Title V, Chapter I. 
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Timeliness 
Regarding initiating the liquidation process, the supervisor can appoint a provisional administrator 
with all the powers to administer, manage, and represent the bank as soon as the bank’s financial 
situation deteriorates and it cannot meet the minimum regulatory requirements in the foreseeable 
future, or in other extraordinary circumstances that can jeopardize the bank’s solvency.106 However, 
the initiation of liquidation could also be voluntary by the creditor bank (non-significant institutions).  
This possibility lends itself to delayed initiation of the court-based liquidation process to the extent 
that the supervisor does not take the initiative.107  
Regarding resolution of the insolvency and paying depositors, in bank insolvency (as with corporate 
bankruptcy) there is no immediate resolution and the average time from the petition to open the 
insolvency proceedings to its conclusion may be long and variable. Procedural requirements and 
publicity involved in formal judicial proceedings (e.g. creditors’ meeting) lengthen the bankruptcy 
process, and so may exacerbate liquidity and credit losses. On average, the time to enforce a 
contract through the courts is approximately 17 months. 
The deposit insurance scheme (Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos) obliges the insurer to pay 
compensation in case bankruptcy has been declared or a deposit becomes ‘unavailable’, i.e. when 
the deposit has become due but has not been paid. The supervisor must declare any present or 
shortly foreseeable ‘unavailability’.108 
 
                                                          
106 The withdrawal of the bank’s license would lead to winding-up. 
107 Act 22/2003, 9 April, on Insolvency, amended by Act 9/2015, 26 May, on Urgent Measures regarding 
Insolvency, Article 2. 
108 Royal Decree 16/2011, 14th Octubre establishes the Spanish deposit insurance scheem (Fondo de Garantía 
de Depósitos) (Article 8. 
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Table 1: Institutional framework for bank resolution and liquidation: Selected countries 
 Are resolution and liquidation under the same authority? Are resolution and liquidation regulated in the same law? Who can close a Credit Institution (CI)? 
US Yes 
Resolution of deposit-taking institutions: Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) 
SIFIs including bank holding companies, non-bank financial companies 
including insurance brokers and dealers Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act 
establishes a special insolvency regime under the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority (OLA)  
No 
1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) 
2010 Dodd-Frank Act (Title II) establishes a special insolvency regime 
under OLA for SIFIs, including bank holding companies 
Chartering authority or FDIC for insured banks 
SIFIs including bank holding companies, and non-bank financial 
companies such as insurance brokers and dealers: OLA requires 
recommendations from super-majorities of the board of governors and 




German Federal Agency of Financial Stabilisation (Bundes-anstalt für 




Resolution: (i) German Restructuring Act or (ii) German Recovery and 
Resolution Act supplemented by German Banking Act 
Liquidation: German Insolvency Act 
BaFin and ECB (revoking bank licence) 
Court  
France Authority for Prudential Supervision and Resolution (Autorité de 
contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR)) (resolution), which forms 




ACPR and ECB (revoking bank licence) 
Court 
Italy Bank of Italy (resolution) 
Liquidator in consultation with the Bank of Italy (liquidation) 
No 
Resolution: Decrees No 180/2015 and No 181/2015 implemented the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive; Legislative Decree No. 385 of 
1 September 1993, as subsequently amended and supplemented  
[Liquidation: Royal Decree No 267 of 16 March 1942 on Insolvency, 
Composition with Creditors and Compulsory Administrative 
Liquidation, as subsequently amended and supplemented][Needs to 
confirmed by Italian lawyer] 
Minister for the Economy and Finance on the Bank of Italy’s proposal. 
The Bank of Italy appoints liquidator, who will act under its supervision. 
Spain No 
FROB and Bank of Spain (resolution) 
Court (liquidation) 
No 
Resolution: Legal Act 11/2015, 18 June, on Recovery and Resolution of 
Credit Institutions and investment Firms 
Liquidation: Act 22/2003, 9 April, on Insolvency, amended by Act 
9/2015, 26 May, on Urgent Measures regarding Insolvency. Act 6/2005, 
22 April, on Restructuring and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions 




Bank of England (BoE) (resolution) 
Insolvency practitioner appointed by Bank of England in consultation 
with the PRA and Secretary of State in specific instances  
Systemic relevant institutions as defined by BoE: Banking Act 2009 – BIP 
and BAP 
Non-systemic relevant: Insolvency Act 1986 and Insolvency Rules 2016 
Non-systemic relevant: Insolvency Act 1986 and Insolvency Rules 2016 
PRA (power to revoke bank permission) 
 
Switzerland Yes  
FINMA 
 
Yes (Ordinance of 30 August 2012 of the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority on the Insolvency of Banks and Securities Dealers 
(Banking Insolvency Ordinance, BIO-FINMA) 109   
  
FINMA (supervision, resolution, and liquidation) 
 
 
                                                          
109 Recent amendments of the provisions of the Swiss Federal Banking Statute of 8 November 1934 (the ‘Banking Statute’) on the recovery and resolution of 
banks and securities dealers, substantially amended in 2004, 2011, and 2012, respectively. 
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Table 2: Bank insolvency in Germany, the UK, and Spain 
 
 
Initiation Moratorium Insolvency 
management  
Priorities/collateral/set-off Pre-insolvency Timeliness Legal certainty 
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Insolvency Law ensures 











Bank of England 
BofE – Court/Bank 
Liquidator 
Financial Collateral Directive 
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No clear cut pre-
insolvency stage 
but places specific 
focus on risks to the 

















Law clearly spells out 
grounds to apply for an 
insolvency order  





Application to court Court/bank 
liquidator 
Financial Collateral Directive 
 
Tiered depositor preference 
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Table 3  
 





Resolution – Within Public 
Interest Threshold 





    
Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza SpA 
    
Veneto Banca SpA     
ABLV Bank 
Latvia (parent) 




   * 
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